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PROTECTING THE ANIMALS: THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE AND THE PREVENTION OF RITUAL
SACRIFICE
CAROLINE E. JOHNSON
[A] man brings the first live chicken into the apartment. He brushes
it across the priest's chest and back. Still another man places the bird
upon the altar and holds down its feet. The chicken, overcome by
fear, begins to struggle vainly. Raising the bird's head, the priest
begins to pluck its feathers, sprinkling them haphazardly over the
pots and the altar. He bows silently before the altar, praying to
Babalu Aye. Taking the knife from one of the cauldrons, the priest
slits the chicken's throat, severing the carotid arteries. A short
stream of blood shoots from the laceration, and the bird dies. The
priest and his assistant drip blood over the objects adorning the
altar. They then decapitate the chicken and place its head on a pot.
One of the men bites into the breast bone of the bird's now headless
body and rips the animal open with his teeth. He stuffs the open
chest of the chicken with various herbs, tobacco, and bits of dried
fish. After bathing the carcass in liquid from one of the cauldrons,
he wraps it in a brown paper bag and places it outside the apartment.
Later, the carcass will be buried near a cemetery. The ceremony is
repeated with two more chickens, two roosters, a pigeon and a small
goat. Finally, the priest informs the participants that the ceremonies
have ended-Babalu Aye is pleased.'
I. INTRODUCTION
T he Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prevents gov-
ernment from burdening the free exercise of religion.' "The free
I. Roberto A. Torricella, Jr., Babalu Aye Is Not Pleased: Majoritarianism and the Ero-
sion of Free Exercise, 45 U. MIAMn L. REv. 1061, 1062-63 (general description of the Santeria
ritual based on Chavez, Santeria: A Cult of Sacrifice, UPI, Oct. 11, 1981, available in Lexis,
Nexis Library, Omni File). Babalu Aye, one of the Santeria gods, is the patron god of the sick.
Id. at 1063 n.2. Because Santeria is primarily a religion practiced underground in homes by small
groups that are unaffiliated with one another, individual rituals may differ. Id.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof .... " Id. (emphasis added). When taken together, the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause ensure that government remains "benevolent[lyl [neutral]" toward relig-
ion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). The Free Exercise Clause applies to the
states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303 (1940).
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exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires." 3 Thus, the First
Amendment excludes governmental regulation of religious beliefs.4
Consequently, most free exercise claims constitute requests for ex-
emptions from laws that interfere with the practice of a religion by
individuals or groups.' In most free exercise cases, therefore, the
claim is not that the law is facially unconstitutional, but rather that
the law is unconstitutional as applied to the individuals or groups
involved in the action.6 Indeed, several significant free exercise cases
involve claims by individuals and groups that the challenged law for-
bids religiously required conduct. 7
For example, in Florida, a religious group sued the City of Hi-
aleah claiming, in part, that city ordinances regulating ritual animal
sacrifice violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause.' The
group, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, practices the Santeria
religion.9 Many of the rituals and ceremonies conducted by practi-
tioners of Santeria require the sacrifice of animals. 0 When the group
announced plans to open a Santeria church in Hialeah, pursuing its
goal of bringing the practice of the Santeria faith into the open, the
city council of Hialeah enacted several ordinances effectively prohib-
iting the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes." In a recent de-
cision, the United States Supreme Court declared Hialeah's
ordinances void because they restricted only religiously-motivated
conduct.'"
This Comment begins with a brief history of free exercise jurispru-
dence, including a discussion of the distinction between government
regulation of beliefs and regulation of practices or conduct as well as
the compelling interest standard. Next, this Comment examines a
3. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
4. Id.; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
5. Philip Spare, Free Exercise of Religion: A- New Translation, 96 DICK. L. REV. 705, 706
(1992); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1989-90).
6. Marshall, supra note 5, at 357.58; Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-
Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmCs & PuB. POL'Y 591, 592 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (peyote use by Native Ameri-
cans); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy practice by the Mormons).
8. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1471; see also J. Brent Walker, Free Exercise of Religion: A Right, Not a Luxury,
FLA. B.J., Dec. 1992, at 26.
11. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2223
(1993); see also Walker, supra note 10, at 26.
12. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2234.
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new standard applicable to free exercise claims as articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith. 3
This Comment then discusses the Court's most recent free exercise
case, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.14
Finally, this Comment presents guidelines and proposes alternative
approaches to drafting ordinances which would prevent the ritual
sacrifice of animals without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
A brief examination of the historical application of the Free Exer-
cise Clause aids in understanding its present application. Two cases
in particular are relevant to this understanding and deserve detailed
explanation. First, Reynolds v. United States" represents the first
significant United States Supreme Court case concerning the Free
Exercise Clause. 6 Second, Sherbert v. Verner'17 serves as the first
case in the Supreme Court's modern interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. 8
A. Reynolds v. United States: The Distinction Between Regulation
of Religious Belief and Regulation of Religious Conduct
George Reynolds belonged to the Church of Jesus Christ of, Lat-
ter-Day Saints, commonly called the Mormon Church.' 9 One of the
doctrinal tenets of this religion provides that male members of the
church have the duty to practice polygamy. 0 Reynolds, a devout
Mormon, received permission from his church and entered into a po-
lygamous marriage. 2' The government then charged-him with bigamy
in violation of a federal law prohibiting the practice.22
The Reynolds Court thus addressed the issue of whether "religious
belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal
by the law of the land." 23 After examining the history of the Free
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2217(1993).
15. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
16. Spare, supra note 5. at 707; Tali H. Shaddow. Religious Ritual Exemptions: Sacrificing
Animal Rights for Ideology, 24 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1367, 1383 (1991).
17. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
18. Shaddow, supra note 16, at 1384.
19. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
20. Id. "[Flailing or refusing to practise [sic] polygamy by such male members of said
church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and ... the penalty for such
failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come." Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 146.
23. Id. at 162.
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Exercise Clause and laws criminalizing polygamy, the Court con-
cluded that, although Congress could not regulate "mere opinion,"
it could regulate actions "in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order."' 24 In addition, the Court noted that in every state
polygamy had always constituted an offense against society that was
recognized by the courts and punished with severity. 25 As a result,
Congress had the power to enact a statute criminalizing polygamy. 26
Moreover, the Reynolds Court refused to recognize an exception
for those who made polygamy a part of their religion. 27 Again, the
Court pointed to the scope of Congress's regulatory power: "Laws
are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac-
tices." ' 28 To allow a religious exception "would be to make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."2 9
The Court reasoned that when "a positive act which is knowingly
done" constitutes a crime, "it would be dangerous to hold that the
offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed the
law which he had broken ought never to have been made." 30 Thus,
the Court determined that the Free Exercise Clause did not compel
an exception for actions prohibited by the criminal law. 3' Conse-
quently, the Court upheld Reynolds' conviction. 2
The Reynolds Court's distinction between religious belief and re-
ligious practice forms an integral part of free exercise jurispru-
dence.33 Indeed, as many courts have since affirmed,3 4 the freedom
to believe is absolute, the freedom to act is not.3"
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id. at 165. The Court explained that at common law the second marriage was void. Id.
at 164. In addition, in England and later in Virginia, the offense of polygamy was punishable by
death. Id. at 165.
26. Id. at 166.
27. I ld. at 167.
28. Id. at 166. The Court also posited the following: "Suppose one believed that human
sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the
civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?" Id.
29. Id. at 167.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 168.
33. Spare, supra note 5, at 708. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (quoting Reynolds).
34. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tenn. 1975).
35. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164-67.
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B. Sherbert v. Verner: The Compelling Interest Standard
Adell Sherbert belonged to the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in
South Carolina.36 Her employer fired her because she refused to
work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day for Seventh-Day Adventists.317
She could not find another job because of her refusal to work on
Saturday and she filed a claim for unemployment compensation pur-
suant to the state's Unemployment Compensation Act.38 The South
Carolina Employment Security Commission determined that she did
not qualify for unemployment benefits. 9 Consequently, Sherbert
challenged the provisions of the state law as they applied to her on
the ground that the statute violated her right to the free exercise of
her religion. 40
In Sherbert v. Verner,41 the Supreme Court established a compel-
ling interest test applicable to claims for religious exemptions. 42
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan focused on the burden
placed on the religious practice and the government interest at
stake.43 The Court first determined that the disqualification for ben-
efits imposed a burden on the free exercise of Sherbert's religion. 44
The Court explained that "'[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate
invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indi-
rect.'" 5 Finding the denial of Sherbert's benefits derived solely from
the practice of her religion, the Court explained that the Employ-
ment Security Commission's determination forced her to choose be-
tween her religion and the benefits offered." 6 The Court concluded
that "to condition the availability of benefits upon [Sherbert's] will-
ingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effec-
36. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 399-400.
39. Id. at 401. The Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County upheld the Commis-
sion's finding as did the South Carolina Supreme Court. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court
specifically found that her ineligibility for benefits did not infringe upon constitutional liberties
"because such a construction of the statute 'places no restriction upon [her] freedom of religion
nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her relig-
ious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience."' Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
125 S.E.2d 737, 746 (S.C. 1962)).
40. Id. at 401.
41. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
42. id. at 406.
43. Id. at 403; see also Torricella, supra note 1, at 1073.
44. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
45. Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
46. Id.
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tively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. ' 47
The Court also noted that the state "expressly saves the Sunday wor-
shipper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold
infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty." 48
Second, the Court considered whether a compelling state interest
justified the substantial infringement of Sherbert's free exercise
rights. 49 "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship
to some colorable state interest would suffice: in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' 50 The
Court concluded that no such abuse or danger existed in this case.5 '
Finally, the Court held that states "may not constitutionally apply
the eligibility provisions [of public welfare legislation] so as to con-
strain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the
day of rest." 2
The Sherbert Court thus raised the level of inquiry in claims
brought under the Free Exercise Clause to that of strict scrutiny."
The Court indicated that even if the government asserted a compel-
ling interest, it would still have to demonstrate that "no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing
First Amendment rights. '5 4 Therefore, according to the Sherbert
test, if a government action substantially burdens a religious prac-
tice, then the government must justify that action with a compelling
state interest achieved through the least restrictive means."
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
51. Id. at 407.
52. Id. at 410.
53. Torricella, supra note 1, at 1074.
54. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
55. Id. at 403-07; see also Torricella, supra note I, at 1074. The Supreme Court further
developed and distinguished the Sherbert compelling interest standard in subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (Free Exer-
cise Clause did not prohibit government from permitting timber harvesting and road construc-
tion in area of national forest traditionally used for religious purposes by American Indians);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (state's use of social security number for Native American
child in determining eligibility did not impair child's parents' free exercise rights); United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish employer could not avoid payment of social security taxes on
ground that imposition of taxes violated his First Amendment free exercise rights); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent state from compelling
Amish parents to send their children to formal high school); see also Torricella, supra note l. at
1075-83.
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III. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION v. SMITH: A NEW FREE EXERCISE
STANDARD?
Alfred Smith and Galen Black belonged to the Native American
Church in Oregon.5 6 Their employer, a private drug rehabilitation or-
ganization, fired them because they ingested peyote for sacramental
purposes at a religious ceremony. 7 Oregon law prohibited the know-
ing or intentional possession of a "controlled substance," including
peyote, unless prescribed by a medical practitioner. 8 When Smith and
Black applied to the Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon, the agency determined they did not qualify for
unemployment compensation because they had been discharged for
work-related misconduct.19
In Employment Division v. Smith,6° the United States Supreme
Court articulated a new standard for cases brought under the Free
Exercise Clause. 61 In a much criticized 62 and controversial63 opinion,
the majority held that the Free Exercise Clause permitted the State of
56. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the facts and extensive procedural history in
Smith, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111-14(1990).
60. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. Id. at 884-85.
62. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1
(1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Remnants]; Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on
Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Laycock, Assault]; McConnell, supra note 59 at 1109; Walker, supra note 10 at 22.
63. The decision prompted "a petition for rehearing joined by an unusually broad-based
coalition of religious and civil liberties groups from right to left and over a hundred constitu-
tional law scholars ... which proved futile, as well as a drive for legislative correction.
McConnell, supra note 59, at 1111; see also Laycock, Assault, supra note 62, at 99.
The drive for legislative correction consisted of a bill, known as the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, which would create a federal statutory right to free exercise. Laycock, Assault,
supra note 62, at 113; Spare, supra note 5. at 730; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). The bipartisan sponsors of this proposed
legislation intend to correct the "error" in Smith by providing that "no state or local govern-
ment may restrict religious practice, except by facially neutral laws that serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest by the least restrictive means." Laycock, Assault, supra note 62, at 113; see
also Ron Fournier, New Law Aimed at Protecting Religious Rights, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Nov. 17, 1993, at 4A. Thus, the bill would reinstate the Sherlert test. Spare, supra note 5, at
730; David G. Savage, Supreme Court to Weigh Law Against Sacrificial Rites, L.A. TumEs, Mar.
24, 1992, at A14; Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom? Broad Coalition Protests Impact
of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at Al; see Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)("The purposes of this Act are . . . to re-
store the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner .... "). Both the House of
Representatives and the Senate passed the bill. Fournier, supra, at 4A. On November 16, 1993,
President Clinton signed the bill into law. Id.
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Oregon to include "religiously inspired peyote use" as part of its gen-
eral criminal prohibition on the use of hallucinogenic drugs.6 The
Court further held the Sherbert compelling interest test inapplicable to
free exercise challenges of general criminal prohibitions"
In so holding, the majority explained that "the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes)."' 6 The Court further reasoned that "[tihe government's
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development."' 6 Then, citing Rey-
nolds, the Court explained that "[making] an individual's obligation
to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his re-
ligious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling'-per-
mitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a law unto himself'-
contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense."
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that "we cannot
afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect
an interest of the highest order." 69 Consequently, the Court effectively
limited the Sherbert test to unemployment compensation cases 70 and
held the Free Exercise Clause did not compel an exemption to a gener-
ally-applicable criminal law for a nondiscriminatory religious prac-
tice. 7' Justice Scalia specifically concluded that the First Amendment's
protection of religious liberty did not require a judicially-created relig-
ious exemption for the use of peyote. 2 Instead, the majority advanced
the following theoretical argument:
64. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
65. Id. at 885. Arguably, the Court had already begun to retreat from the Sherbert test
before Smith. Marshall, supra note 5, at 369; see also supra note 55.
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
67. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 (1988)).
68. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
69. Id. at 888.
70. Id. at 884-85.
71. Id. at 889. Instead of a compelling interest test, the Court applied a weakened "rational
basis" test. Walker, supra note 10, at 24.
72. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Significantly, in a listing of situations in which courts would
face "the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind" if the court created an exemption in this case, Justice Scalia
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[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is
permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is
constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its
creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that
leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in;
but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or
in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs.7 3
Therefore, rather than providing judicial relief, the Court left the for-
mation of a religious exemption to the legislative process.7 4
Thus, under the new Smith test, if a law is facially neutral and gen-
erally applicable, the government does not need to show a compelling
interest."5 The law is valid even if it interferes with the free exercise
rights of individuals or groups. The majority articulated two excep-
tions to this new rule, however. First, if a statute targets a particular
religious practice for discriminatory treatment, the courts should ap-
ply the compelling interest test.76 Second, the compelling interest test
would also apply in a hybrid situation where a statute affects the Free
Exercise Clause "in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press." 77
IV. CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC. V. CITY OF
HILEAH: IMPERMISSIBLY TARGETING A RELIGION FOR DISCRIMINATORY
TREATMENT
Members of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye practice the
Santeria religion. 8 Animal sacrifice serves as one of the principal
included animal cruelty laws, with a citation to the opinion of the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah. Id.
at 888-89; see Brief for the Humane Society of the United States at 6 (Statement of the Case),
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948).
Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, refers to this list as a "parade of horribles."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
74. See McConnell, supra note 59, at 1132. "Under the Smith Court's conception, courts
will not be able to order exceptions from laws of general applicability-but legislators will." Id.
75. Walker, supra note 10, at 24; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89.
76. Walker, supra note 10, at 24; see Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79.
77. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881; see Walker, supra note 10, at 24.
78. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2223
(1993). The Santeria religion originated in the nineteenth century when the Yoruba people were
brought to Cuba from Africa as slaves. Id. at 2222. The traditional African religion of the Yo-
ruba absorbed elements of Roman Catholicism resulting in the Santeria religion. Id. "The Cu-
ban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic
saints, Catholic symbols are often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees attend the
Catholic sacraments." Id.
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forms of devotion for members of the Santeria faith. 79 When the
Church leased land in the city of Hialeah, Florida, it announced plans
to establish a house of worship, a school, cultural center and a mu-
seum, consistent with its goal of bringing the practice of the Santeria
faith, including its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open; the city
council responded by holding an emergency public session.8 0 At that
session and those that followed, the city council passed various resolu-
tions and ordinances regulating the practice of animal sacrifice.', Fol-
lowing the enactment of the ordinances, the Church sued the city,
seeking specifically "the right of the Church to perform animal sacri-
fices on Church premises, and . . . the right of Church members to
perform sacrifices in their own homes." 2
A. The District Court Opinion
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida upheld the ordinances and found no violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.83 The court began its analysis with a recognition of the Rey-
nolds distinction between belief and action: "[W]e are dealing ...
with the manner in which the religion is conducted rather than the
beliefs of those seeking to exercise it."'1 4 The court then applied the
framework for addressing free exercise claims established by the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grosz v. City of Miami Beach:85
"Before the [c]ourt balances competing governmental and religious
interests, the government's action faces two threshold tests: the law
must regulate conduct rather than belief, and it must have both a sec-
ular purpose and effect." ' 86 Because the ordinances attempted to regu-
late the performance of animal sacrifice and not belief, the court
found the ordinances were clearly directed at conduct and thus satis-
fied the first threshold test.8 7 As for the second threshold test, the
court found the city's adoption of the ordinances constituted an at-
tempt to address the general issue of animal sacrifice and was not tar-
79. Id. at 2222. "The basis of the Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relation with
the orishas, and one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice." Id. The Santeria
followers believe the orishas are not immortal and depend on the sacrifices for survival. Id.
80. Id. at 2223.
81. Id.
82. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1469
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
83. Id. at 1488.
84. Id. at 1483.
85. 721 F.2d 729 (1 Ith Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
86. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1483.
87. Id.
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geted solely at the Church. a8 Further, the ordinances did not violate
the secular purpose test. 9
The district court then balanced the governmental and religious in-
terests20 Although the ordinances did burden the Church's religious
practices, the city had compelling interests in preventing cruelty to an-
imals, safeguarding the health, welfare and safety of the community,
and preventing possible adverse effects on children exposed to the sac-
rifices. 9' Finding the interest in preventing animal cruelty compelling,
the court noted that "it is now generally recognized that legislation
which has for its purpose the protection of animals from harassment
and ill-treatment is a valid exercise of the police power." 92 The court
also determined that "the method of killing [utilized by the Santerias]
is unreliable and not humane, and that the animals, before being sac-
rificed, are often kept in conditions that produce a great deal of fear
and stress in the animal." 9 Moreover, the city had a particularly
strong interest in prohibiting the slaughter of animals in private homes
and residential areas. 94
The district court therefore upheld the ordinances as constitutional:
"Compelling governmental interests, including public health and
safety and animal welfare, fully justify the absolute prohibition on
ritual sacrifice . . . and any effort to exempt purportedly religious
conduct from the strictures of the City's laws would significantly
hinder the attainment of these compelling interests." 9
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case.9
The Court held that ordinances passed by the city of Hialeah address-
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1484.
91. Id. at 1485-87.
92. Id. at 1486 (quoting C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968)).
93. Id. The court noted: "Often the animals are kept in filthy, overcrowded conditions, and
sometimes are not given adequate food or water. Additionally, the animals perceive both pain
and fear during the actual sacrificial ceremony." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1487.
96. 112 S.Ct. 1472 (1992). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the district
court's decision in a one-paragraph per curiam unreported opinion. Church of the Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586 (1 1th Cir. 1991); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2225 (1993). The Eleventh Circuit concluded the
ordinances were consistent with the Constitution, but it did not rely on the district's court's
analysis of a compelling interest in promoting the welfare of children. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at
2225. The court of appeals also declined to address the effect of the Smith decision, which the
Supreme Court decided after the district court rendered its opinion, because the district court
had used "an arguably stricter standard" than that employed in Smith. Id.
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ing the ritual sacrifice and slaughter of animals were not neutral and
not of general applicability. 97 Further, the Court held that the asserted
governmental interest advanced by the ordinances did not justify the
targeting of religious activity.98
The Court first determined that Santeria is a "religion" within the
meaning of the First Amendment: "Although the practice of animal
sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, 'religious beliefs need not be
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection.' 99 The Court then articulated the
general rule from Smith applicable to free exercise claims: "[A] law
that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental ef-
fect of burdening a particular religious practice."'10 Applying this
rule, the Court determined that the ordinances failed to satisfy the
Smith requirements.' 0'
The Court explained that the Free Exercise Clause protects indivi-
duals from laws that discriminate against religious beliefs or regulate
conduct undertaken for religious reasons. 02 Indeed, "a law targeting
religious beliefs as such is never permissible."'' 13 Moreover, "if the ob-
ject of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their
religious motivation, the law is not neutral.. . and it is invalid unless
it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to ad-
vance that interest. "14
1. The Neutrality Inquiry: Preventing Religious Gerrymanders
To determine whether the law has a neutral object, the court should
examine the text of the law, including an analysis of whether its terms
are facially neutral and whether it constitutes a religious gerryman-
der.'10 The court should also examine the operation of the law, includ-
ing its impact, the conduct prohibited, and the protected interests
involved.1°6 As the Supreme Court explained, "[n]eutrality and gen-
eral applicability are interrelated, and . . . failure to satisfy one re-
97. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
98. Id. at 2234.
99. Id. at 2225 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707,714 (1981)).
100. Id. at 2226.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2227.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2227-28.
106. Id. at 2228-31.
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quirement is a likely indication that the other has not been
satisfied." 0 7 Further, if a law does not satisfy these requirements, the
government must justify it by a compelling interest and narrowly tai-
lor the law to advance that interest.'18
a. The Text of the Law: Facial Neutrality and Masked Hostility
"[T]he minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not dis-
criminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a relig-
ious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language
or context." ,09 Facial neutrality alone, however, is not determinative:
Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment
cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of
facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against
governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt. "The Court
must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate . . . religious gerrymanders . ''0
Upon an examination of the ordinances at issue, the Court found that
although the words "sacrifice" and "ritual" have a religious origin,
they also have secular meanings; therefore, this step of the analysis
was not conclusive. II1
Nevertheless, the Court examined the record and determined that
"suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service
was the object of the ordinances.""' In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied on a couple of factors. First, although the choice of the
words "sacrifice" and "ritual" did not alone compel a finding of im-
proper targeting, the use of these words provided support for that
conclusion."' In addition, because the city council expressed the gen-
eral concerns of the city's residents in enacting the ordinances and re-
solutions at issue, the Court determined the officials had the Santeria
religion particularly in mind." 4
107. Id. at 2226.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2227.
110. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2227-28. "Resolution 87-66 . recited that 'residents and citizens of the City of
Hialeah have expressed their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices
which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,' and 'reiterate[d]' the city's commit-
ment to prohibit 'any and all [such] acts of any and all religious groups."' Id.
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b. The Operation of the Law: Impact, Prohibited Conduct, and
Protected Interests
The Court next examined the operation of the ordinances because
"[a]part from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is
strong evidence of its object."'1 5 In this step of the analysis, the Court
considered the impact of the ordinances when taken together and indi-
vidually, the conduct prohibited, and the interests protected." 6
The Court explained that adverse impact alone will not always con-
stitute impermissible targeting."' Citing Reynolds as an example, the
Court pointed out that "a social harm may have been a legitimate
concern of government for reasons quite apart from discrimina-
tion.""' 8 The Court also acknowledged that the issue under considera-
tion implicated "multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity,
for example, the suffering or mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed
animals, and health hazards from improper disposal."" 9 Nonetheless,
the Court determined that taken together the ordinances evidenced an
object other than those legitimate concerns and constituted a "relig-
ious gerrymander" -an impermissible attempt to target the Church
and its religious practices. 20
The Court then separately examined each of the four ordinances
and found that almost the only conduct subject to three of the ordi-
nances was the religious exercise of the Santerias.' 2' "[Flew if any kill-
ings of animals are prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is
proscribed because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and its pri-
115. Id. at 2228.
116. In determining whether the law had a neutral object, Justice Kennedy, author of the
majority opinion, was also guided by previous Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, including
an analysis of the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific events leading to
the ordinances' enactment, and the legislative or administrative history of the ordinances. Id. at
2230-31. Because only Justice Stevens joined in this part of the opinion, this aspect of the
Court's analysis lacks the support of the majority, and this Comment will not address it as
relevant to the neutrality of the ordinances' operation. Id. at 2221.
Nevertheless, it is worthy of mention that Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, declined to join that section of the opinion "because it departs from the
opinion's general focus on the object of the laws at issue to consider the subjective motivation of
the lawmakers, i.e., whether the Hialeah City Council actually intended to disfavor the religion
of Santeria." Id. at 2239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus,
Scalia found that the First Amendment "does not refer to the purposes for which legislators
enact laws, but to the effects of the laws enacted." Id. at 2240.
117. Id. at2228.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The three ordinances were 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71. Id. at 2228-29. Only Ordinance
87-72 appeared to apply to substantial secular conduct. Id. at 2230.
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mary purpose is ... not food consumption."' 2 Further, if the killing
of the animal is not accompanied by the intent to use the animal for
food or if the killing is specifically for food but it does not occur dur-
ing a ritual, the killing falls outside of the prohibitions; however, as
the Court explained, these exemptions do not apply to Santeria sacri-
fices.' 23 Similarly, the Santerias do not qualify for the exemption for
killing animals for food during the course of a ritual if the killing
occurs in a properly zoned and licensed establishment and the animals
are specifically raised for food purposes. 124 The Court found that each
of these exemptions contributed to the religious gerrymander. 25 The
Court further noted that "in circumstances in which individualized ex-
emptions from a general requirement are available, the government
'may not refuse to extend that system to cases of "religious hardship"
without compelling reason." ' 26 Therefore, the Court determined the
city council had singled out this religious practice for discriminatory
treatment. 27
In addition, that the ordinances proscribed more religious conduct
than necessary to achieve the stated ends further evidenced the im-
proper targeting of Santeria sacrifice.' "It is not unreasonable to in-
fer, at least when there are no persuasive indications to the contrary,
that a law which visits 'gratuitous restrictions' on religious conduct
... seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests, but to
suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation."' 29
Finally, the Court considered the interests protected by the ordi-
nances and determined "[tihe legitimate governmental interests in
protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could
be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of
all Santeria sacrificial practice."' 30 Thfe Court found that "these broad
ordinances prohibit Santeria sacrifice even when it does not threaten
the city's interest in the public health."' 3 "The neutrality of a law is
suspect if First Amendment freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated
collateral harms not themselves prohibited by direct regulation."' 3 2
122. Id. at 2228.
123. Id. at 2228-29.
124. Id. at 2229.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 520 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter,J.)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2230.
132. Id.
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Thus, because the city could achieve its interests through narrower
regulation, it had improperly targeted Santeria sacrificial practice.
For example, the Court found the city could address its interest in
preventing cruelty to animals through narrower regulation. "With re-
gard to the city's interest in ensuring the adequate care of animals,
regulation of conditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal is
kept, is the logical response to the city's concern, not a prohibition on
possession for the purpose of sacrifice.' '1 33 Similarly, in addressing the
city's interest in prohibiting cruel methods of killing, "the subject of
the regulation should be the method of slaughter itself, not a religious
classification that is said to bear some general relation to it."14 Thus,
the ordinances had the suppression of religion as their object and were
not neutral:
The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents
and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target
this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were
gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress
much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the
legitimate ends asserted in their defense. 131
2. The General Applicability Inquiry: Preventing Selective
Enforcement of Governmental Interests
The Court next analyzed the general applicability of the ordinances,
because, in addition to being neutral, laws burdening religious prac-
tice must also be generally applicable. 3 6 "All laws are selective to
some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern
when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious prac-
tice.' 3 7 "The Free Exercise Clause 'protect[s] religious observers
against unequal treatment,' and inequality results when a legislature
decides that the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy
of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation."' 3 s
The Court declined to define precisely the standard for evaluating
whether a prohibition is generally applicable, deciding instead that
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2231.
136. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-82 (1990).
137. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2232.
138. Id. (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 148 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
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"these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to
protect First Amendment rights." 3 9
The Court found the ordinances underinclusive regarding the ad-
vanced interests of protecting the public health and preventing animal
cruelty because they did not prohibit secular conduct that endangered
the interests to a similar or greater degree than the Santeria prac-
tices.' 40 Moreover, "[tihe underinclusion is substantial, not inconse-
quential."' 14' First, the ordinances forbid few killings of animals other
than those resulting from the Santeria practice of ritual sacrifice. 42
The Court pointed out that fishing, hunting, extermination of rodents
within a home, as well as euthanasia of animals in shelters and veteri-
nary clinics are all permitted. 43 The city could not explain to the
Court's satisfaction "why religion alone must bear the burden of the
ordinances, when many of these secular killings fall within the city's
interest in preventing the cruel treatment of animals."'"
Second, the Court found the ordinances underinclusive in address-
ing the threat to the city's public health interest posed by the disposal
of carcasses in public places and the consumption of uninspected meat
because "[n]either interest is pursued by [the city] with regard to con-
duct that is not motivated by religious conviction."'1 45 For instance,
"[tlhe health risks posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses
are the same whether Santeria sacrifice or some nonreligious killing
preceded it."' The ordinances do not address disposal by hunters
and restaurants. 47 Further, hunters and fishermen may eat their game
without undergoing governmental inspection.'" Thus, similar to the
interest in disposal of animal carcasses, "[t]he asserted interest in in-
spected meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that of religious
animal sacrifice." 149
Therefore, the Court concluded that the ordinances pursue the ci-
ty's interests only against religiously motivated conduct. As a result,
because they constitute "'a prohibition that society is prepared to im-
pose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself,"' the ordi-
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2233.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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nances represent the evil that the requirement of general applicability
seeks to prevent. 0
3. The Holding
Based on its analysis, the Court determined the ordinances did not
withstand strict scrutiny. 5' "A law that targets religious conduct for
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests
only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict
scrutiny only in rare cases."'152 The ordinances were substantially over-
broad or underinclusive, their objectives were not pursued with re-
spect to nonreligious conduct, and their interests could have been
achieved through narrower regulation. 3 As the court explained,
"[t]he absence of narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity
of the ordinances."''154
Furthermore, the Court found that the city failed to demonstrate
that its interests were compelling.'55 "Where government restricts only
conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible
measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or al-
leged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the
restriction is not compelling.' '156 The majority concluded its opinion
with an admonition to official policymakers:
Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands
and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of
law and regulation are secular. Legislators may not devise
mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a
religion or its practices. '5"
V. THE PROTECTION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS: GUIDELINES AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW ORDINANCES
After the ruling by the United States Supreme Court in the Hialeah
case, an important question remains: How can the city prohibit the
sacrifice of animals without infringing on the free exercise rights of
150. Id. (quoting The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2234.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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the Santerias? The answer lies in the city's implementation of its legiti-
mate, compelling interests through ordinances more directly tailored
at achieving those interests.' 6
A. Guidelines for Drafting New Ordinances
Doubtless, because of the city's desire to prevent animal sacrifices
regardless of who performs them, any new ordinances passed by the
city would burden the Santeria religious practice. Nonetheless, accord-
ing to Smith, if the law is neutral and of general applicability, the
government does not have to justify such a law with a compelling in-
terest.5 9
First, to be neutral, the law must have facially neutral text that does
not constitute a religious gerrymander.?6 In addition, the law must be
neutral in its application, meaning that (1) the religious exercise of the
Santerias must not be the only conduct subject to the ordinances; 6'
(2) the ordinances must not proscribe more religious conduct than
necessary to achieve the government's interests; 6 and (3) the govern-
ment must not be able to achieve its interests through narrower regu-
lation. 63
Second, to be generally applicable, the law must not be substan-
tially underinclusive, failing to prohibit secular conduct that endan-
gers the government's interests to a similar or greater degree than the
religious practices.1'" If the law satisfies these requirements, the gov-
ernment "may restrict certain activities associated with the practice of
religion pursuant to its general regulatory powers.' '165
B. Suggestions for New Ordinances
1. Zoning Restrictions
Courts have recognized that "municipalities have a significant inter-
est in establishing content-neutral zones in which certain establish-
158. See id. at 2229-30.
159. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990); see Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at
2226.
160. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2227-28.
161. See id. at 2228.
162. See id. at 2229.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 2232.
165. St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1990) (ex-
plaining Smith), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
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ments may locate and specified activities may take place."'- Indeed,
in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,167 the United States Su-
preme Court stated that it had "no doubt that the municipality may
control the location of theaters as well as the location of other com-
mercial establishments, either by confining them to certain specified
commercial zones or by requiring that they be dispersed throughout
the city."168 In Young, the Supreme Court determined that the city's
interest in "preserving the character of its neighborhoods"'' 69 justified
its ordinances differentiating between theaters that exhibit sexually ex-
plicit "adult" movies and those that do not. 70 The Court found that a
factual basis supported the city council's conclusion that the ordi-
nances would effectuate this interest.'7 ' The Court further explained
that the city council had determined that a concentration of the
"adult" movie theaters caused the area to deteriorate and become
crime-ridden, "effects which are not attributable to theaters showing
other types of films."' 2 Because the zoning ordinances attempted to
avoid this "secondary effect" and not the dissemination of offensive
speech, 73 the Court concluded that "the city's interest in the present
and future character of its neighborhoods" adequately supports its or-
dinances. 74 The Court explained its conclusion:
It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the council's]
decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than
concentrated in the same areas. In either event, the city's interest in
attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be
accorded high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly
serious problems. "
Similarly, in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. ,176 the Su-
preme Court analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regula-
166. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 662 (D. Minn. 1990)
(affirmed as to free exercise claim except as to "hybrid rights" claim), aff'd in part, 948 F.2d
464 (8th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of Cornerstone as a hybrid case under Smith, see Spare,
supra note 5, at 725-26.
167. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
168. Id. at 62; see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Although
Young and Renton are free speech zoning cases involving "adult" movie theaters, many of the
same general principles apply to free exercise zoning cases.
169. Young, 427 U.S. at 71.
170. Id. at 52.
171. Id. at 71.
172. Id. at 71 n.34.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 72.
175. ld. at 71.
176. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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tion a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters
from locating in certain areas."' As in Young, the Court concluded
that the city had not aimed the ordinance at the content of the films
shown in the adult theaters, "but rather at the secondary effects of
such theaters on the surrounding community.""' The Court explained
that the district court had determined the city council's "'predominate
concerns' were with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not
with the content of adult films themselves.' 7 9 The Court found that
this determination of predominate intent was "more than adequate to
establish that the city's pursuit of its zoning interests . . .was unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression."' 10 The Court concluded
that, as in Young, a city's interest in preserving the quality of life in
urban areas must be accorded high respect and the city's ordinance
was '''narrowly tailored' to affect only that category of theaters
shown to produce the unwanted secondary effects ... ,, "I Finally,
the Court also dismissed the argument that the ordinance was under-
inclusive because it did not regulate other kinds of adult businesses
that are likely to produce similar secondary effects: "That Renton
chose first to address the potential problems created by one particular
kind of adult business in no way suggests that the city has 'singled
out' adult theaters for discriminatory treatment.' '182
In Florida, "[]land-use control is a local prerogative that is exer-
cised through the use of zoning ordinances."" 3 Zoning laws and regu-
lations enacted by municipalities in the exercise of their police powers
are proper.'8 Thus, "[m]unicipalities may zone land to pursue any
number of legitimate objectives related to the health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the community."' 8 5 Further, as Young and Renton
suggest, the Hialeah city council may determine the performance of
animal sacrifice causes inhumane, abusive treatment to the animals
177. Id. at 46.
178. Id. at 47.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 48. The Court further reasoned that "even if this were a case involving a special
governmental response to the content of one type of movie, it is possible that the result would be
supported by a line of cases recognizing that the government can tailor its reaction to different
types of speech according to the degree to which its special and overriding interests are impli-
cated." Id. at 49.
181. Id. at 52.
182. Id. at 52-53.
183. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1481
(S.D. Fla. 1989); see FA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3213 (1993); Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So. 2d 610, 612-13 (Fla. 1976).
184. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1481; see Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521 (1 1th
Cir. 1988).
185. Scurlock, 858 F.2d at 1525.
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involved, effects that are not attributable to other methods of animal
killing.8 6 Consequently, because this "secondary effect" is what the
resulting zoning ordinances would attempt to avoid and not the enjoy-
ment of the right of free exercise, 8 7 a court could conclude that the
city's interest in preventing the abuse of animals adequately justifies
its ordinances. 88
As in the free speech zoning cases, in these circumstances, Hialeah
would not be aiming the ordinances at the religious practice per-
formed, but rather at the secondary effects of that practice on the
animals' welfare. 9 Analogizing to Renton, this "predominate con-
cern" adequately establishes that the city's pursuit of its zoning inter-
ests is unrelated to the suppression of free exercise.110 Further, the city
should narrowly tailor the ordinance to affect only those particular
methods of killing that produce the unwanted secondary effects.' 9
Then, as in Renton, a court may dismiss an argument that the ordi-
nance is underinclusive because it did not regulate other kinds of
killing 92 that are likely to produce similar secondary effects.' 93
Finally, following the general principles in Young and Renton, the
court could defer to the city's choice to address the problems created
by one particular type of slaughter as its choice "in no way suggests
that the city has 'singled out' [the Santeria method of sacrifice] for
discriminatory treatment."194 It is not the court's function to appraise
the wisdom of the Hialeah city council's decision; rather, the city's
interest in attempting to prevent animal abuse must be accorded high
respect.' 95 "[Tihe city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."' 96 Accord-
ingly, the next sections contain some suggested zoning solutions to the
serious problem of animal abuse.
a. Prohibition on the Intentional Killing of Animals
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that "in a . . . civilized soci-
ety, it is now generally recognized that legislation which has for its
186. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976).
187. See id.
188. Seeid. at72.
189. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
190. Id. at 48.
191. Seeid. at 52.
192. E.g., hunting, fishing, extermination of pests, etc.
193. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.
194. Id. at 53.
195. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976).
196. Id.
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purpose the protection of animals from harassment and ill-treatment
is a valid exercise of the police power.' ' 97 The Florida Statutes give
municipalities the authority to enact ordinances relating to animal cru-
elty. 98 In addition, "a municipality may go beyond the state statute so
long as it does not conflict with the statute."'" As a second alterna-
tive zoning restriction, therefore, the city council could pass an ordi-
nance that prohibits the intentional, inhumane killing of animals in
residential areas. Because most of the Santeria sacrifices are per-
formed in private homes, such an ordinance would effectively curtail
these practices. The ordinance would also prevent the performance of
animal sacrifice by satanic and other cults as well as the inhumane
killing of animals by other individuals or groups. Thus, such an ordi-
nance would constitute a neutral, generally applicable law similar to
that challenged in Smith.
Because of the broad definition given to "animal" under Florida
law, 200 an ordinance prohibiting the intentional killing of animals in
residential areas may also curtail other practices. The Florida Statutes
provide exceptions, however, for the extermination of pests2°0 as well
as for the placing of poison in yards and enclosures. 202 Consequently,
because the city incorporated these statutes and its ordinance will be
construed to operate in conformity with the state law, the city would
197. C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968).
198. FLA. STAT. § 828.27(6) (1993). The statute contains the following provision:
Nothing contained in this section shall prevent any county or municipality from enact-
ing any ordinance relating to animal control or cruelty which is identical to the provi-
sions of this chapter or any other state law, except as to penalty. However, no county
or municipal ordinance relating to animal control or cruelty shall conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or any other state law.
Id. In the district court, the Church had challenged the city ordinances as violating this provision
because the ordinances provided for a criminal penalty. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1989); see also 1988 FLA. ATr'Y GEN.
ANN. REP. 165 ("A county may provide only civil penalties for the violation of an animal con-
trol or cruelty ordinance enacted pursuant to Ch. 828, F.S."). The district court dismissed this
argument, however, by reasoning that the city had enacted penalties for zoning violations: "The
City of Hialeah clearly has the authority to prescribe penalties for zoning violations different
from those relating to animal control or cruelty. Because the ordinances do not solely relate to
animal control or cruelty, the statute establishing the maximum penalty for violation of such an
ordinance is inapplicable." Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1481-82. Further, the district court rea-
soned that even if the statute restricting the penalties that local governments may impose did
apply to Hialeah's ordinances, the criminal penalties provided are "fully consistent with the state
[statute's] prescribed penalty for the same misconduct." Id. at 1482.
199. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. at 1480.
200. See FLA. STAT. § 828.02 (1993) (defines "animal" as including "every living dumb crea-
ture").
201. Id. §§402.021, .071, .132.
202. Id. § 828.08.
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not need to enact exceptions to its ordinance for these practices.
Moreover, although these exceptions appear to constitute an effort to
segregate and prohibit religious killings that the Supreme Court pro-
tected in Hialeah, the Legislature enacted the exceptions when it
passed the state's general animal cruelty law. Therefore, to challenge
the city's ordinance, one would have to challenge the state law as well.
Nevertheless, although the validity of animal cruelty laws remains a
question after Hialeah,203 the state law may withstand such a challenge
because courts have traditionally upheld animal cruelty laws. 204
b. Location of Churches
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized "[tlhe authority of a
city or county to reasonably regulate the location of churches." 25 In
Town v. State ex rel. Reno,' 6 Ms. Town argued that the Miami Beach
zoning ordinances that prohibited her from using her residence as a
church must yield to the First Amendment. 20 7 The trial court found
that her residence served as "a center of operations for the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church":
At least three times a day members of the church would gather in the
main building to pray. Prayer meetings would consist of chanting
and singing and would sometimes last for several hours. Testimony
of several neighbors revealed that approximately thirty people
participated in the regular prayer sessions.2"°
Thus, the factors the trial court considered in determining that the
residence functioned as a church included the frequency of the gather-
ings at the residence, the activities occurring during the meetings, and
the number of participants. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Ms.
Town's argument and upheld a temporary injunction prohibiting the
use of her property as a church. 201
203. See infra part V.B.2.c.
204. See, e.g., C.E. America, Inc. v. Antinori, 210 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. 1968). All fifty
states currently have criminal statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals. Shaddow, supra note 16, at
1393; see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2910 to -2910.04 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE §§
597(b), 597.5 (West 1992); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 350-77 (McKinney 1972 & Supp.
1991).
205. Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 652 (Fla. 1979), cer. denied, 449 U.S. 1004
(1980). See also Pylant v. Orange County, 328 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1976); United Lutheran Church
v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
206. 377 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980).
207. Id. at 651-52.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 652. In rejecting her claim, the court noted that she had not sought a zoning
exception and she did not question the general authority of the city to zone the property. Id.
Also, the zoning was in place when she purchased the property. Id.
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Thus, the Hialeah city council could pass an ordinance prohibiting
the use of residences as churches. Again, such an ordinance would
effectively curtail the Santeria practice of animal sacrifice because the
sacrifices are performed in private homes during rituals that would
most likely qualify as church services due to the frequency of the
meetings, the occurrences during the meetings, and the number of
people participating in the meetings. As soon as the Santeria practi-
tioners establish a church, however, they would begin again their
practice of animal sacrifice. Consequently, to ensure the animals re-
ceive proper treatment and are slaughtered in a permissible manner,
the city could impose regulations and licensing requirements, as later
explained. 21 ° Further, the city could also restrict the slaughter of ani-
mals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use, as next discussed.
c. Slaughterhouse Use
In Florida, local governments have responsibility for the siting and
inspection of slaughterhouses. 21 In Hialeah, the Supreme Court indi-
cated the ordinance that defined "slaughter" as the "killing of ani-
mals for food" and prohibited slaughter outside areas zoned for
slaughterhouses2 12 appeared "to apply to substantial nonreligious con-
duct and not to be overbroad. "213 Further, the Court determined that
it need not decide whether this ordinance alone would survive strict
scrutiny; rather, "it must be invalidated because it functions, with the
rest of the enactments in question, to suppress Santeria religious wor-
ship."12 4 Therefore, to curtail the performance of animal sacrifice re-
gardless of who practices it, the city could reenact this ordinance.
Indeed, this appears as perhaps the least restrictive means of imple-
menting the city's interest in preventing animal sacrifice and also ap-
plies to nonreligious as well as religious conduct. In re-enacting this
ordinance, however, the city should explain why "commercial opera-
210. See infra part V.B.2.
211. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1481 (S.D. Fla.
1989); see FLA. STAT. § 585.34(3) (1993) ("Municipal corporations may establish and maintain
the inspections of slaughterhouses.").
212. Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-72 (1987). Ordinance 87-72 provides, in part, that "[ilt
shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to slaughter any animal
on any premises in the City of Hialeah, Florida, except those properly zoned as a slaughter
house, and meeting al the health, safety and sanitation codes prescribed by the City for the
operation of a slaughter house."
213. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2230
(1993).
214. Id.
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tions that slaughter 'small numbers' of hogs and cattle" are exempted
from the ordinance's operation. 3
2. Regulation and Licensing of Animal Slaughter
In addition to zoning restrictions, the city could impose regulations
on the slaughter of animals to ensure the methods used are humane. ' 6
The city could also impose licensing requirements on establishments
and individuals that slaughter animals.217 Through such requirements,
the city could regulate the conditions in which the animals are kept
prior to being killed as well as the manner in which they are killed. As
Justice Stevens noted in the majority opinion in Hialeah, "[wlith re-
gard to the city's interest in ensuring the adequate care of animals,
regulation of conditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal is
kept, is the logical response to the city's concern, not a prohibition for
the purpose of sacrifice."2I8 Similarly, the Court explained, "[i]f the
city has a real concern that other methods are less humane, however,
the subject of the regulation should be the method of slaughter itself,
not a religious classification that is said to bear some general relation
to it."219
a. Humane Slaughter Requirement
According to the Court, the city can regulate the method of slaugh-
ter to ensure that it is humane.220 To achieve this, the city could adopt
as an ordinance the humane slaughter requirement contained in the
Florida Statutes.22' The legislative findings presented in the statute in-
clude the statement that "the use of humane methods in the slaughter
of livestock prevents needless suffering."m Moreover, the Florida
Legislature has further declared:
[T]he policy of this state [is] to require that the slaughter of all
livestock and the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter
shall be carried out only by humane methods and to provide that
methods of slaughter shall conform generally to those employed in
215. Id. at 2233; see FLA. STAT. § 828.24(3) (1993).
216. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2230.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
221. FLA. STAT. § 828.22 (1993).
222. Id. § 828.22(1). "Livestock" includes "cattle, calves, sheep, swine, horses, mules,
goats, ostriches, and any other animal which can or may be used in and for the preparation of
meat or meat products." Id. § 828.23(4).
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other states where humane slaughter is required by law and to those
authorized by the Federal Humane Slaughter Act of 1958, and
regulations thereunder .223
The statute also provides that nothing in the law "shall be construed
to prohibit, abridge, or in any way hinder the religious freedom of
any person or group. "224 Further, "in order to protect freedom of re-
ligion, ritual slaughter and the handling or other preparation of live-
stock for ritual slaughter are exempted from the terms of [the animal
cruelty law]." 221 Finally, as discussed below, "ritual slaughter" is the
second form of slaughter described in the statute.116 Thus, the statute
expressly exempts ritual slaughter of animals as long as the slaughter
is performed in a permissible, humane manner.
b. Permissible Methods of Slaughter
According to the Florida Statutes, the only permissible methods of
slaughter consist of the following alternatives:
[1 A method whereby the animal is rendered insensible to pain by
mechanical, electrical, chemical, or other means that are rapid and
effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; or
[21 A method in accordance with ritual requirements of any religious
faith whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of
the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of
the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument . 27
The Santeria method of slaughter may fall into the "ritual slaughter"
category. Nevertheless, the district court found that the Santeria
method "is not humane because there is no guarantee that a person
performing a sacrifice . . . can cut through both carotid arteries at the
same time." ' 8 Thus, the city could require, pursuant to the state hu-
mane slaughter statute, that any method used to slaughter animals
must be guaranteed to simultaneously and instantaneously sever both
of the animals' carotid arteries. 29
223. Id. § 828.22(2) (emphasis added); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988).
224. FLA. STAT. § 828.22(3) (1993).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 828.23(7) (1993); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
228. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1472
(S.D. Fla. 1989).
229. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2230
(1993) (city can regulate method of slaughter).
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Any method that does not do so would constitute animal "cruelty,"
defined as including "every act, omission, or neglect whereby unnec-
essary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused, except when done
in the interest of medical science, permitted, or allowed to continue
when there is reasonable remedy or relief. ' ' 230 Finally, to further en-
sure that the animals are slaughtered by humane methods, the city
could impose licensing requirements upon individuals and establish-
ments that slaughter animals. 231
c. The Implications of Smith, Hialeah, and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act on State Slaughter Statutes
The relatively recent decisions in Smith and Hialeah, as well as the
new Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 23 2 may pose problems con-
cerning the state's regulation of methods of animal slaughter. Unless
it can show a compelling interest, the State of Florida cannot constitu-
tionally exclude the Santeria method of slaughter from its permissible
methods of slaughter set forth in the statute. Nevertheless, because of
ambiguities in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, if challenged,
the state may prove successful in arguing for the validity of its statute.
Because the humane slaughter statute provides criminal penalties
for its violation, 233 the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Smith
would apply in free exercise challenges to the statute. Although the
Smith majority concluded that the Free Exercise Clause did not re-
quire a judicially-created exemption for the religiously-inspired use of
peyote23 4 and the government did not have to support its decision not
to provide an exemption with a compelling interest, 23 5 the Court
reached that conclusion because the law at issue did not provide any
exemptions-it constituted "an across-the-board criminal prohibition
on a particular form of conduct.12 36 In the humane slaughter statute,
however, one of the permissible forms constitutes an exemption for
the Kosher method of slaughter. 2 7 Thus, following Smith, because the
statute is not neutral and generally applicable, like the ordinances at
issue in Hialeah, the state would have to show a compelling interest to
230. FLA. STAT. § 828.02 (1993).
231. See Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2230.
232. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
233. FLA. STAT. § 828.26 (1993).
234. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
235. Id. at 884-85.
236. Id. at 884.
237. FLA. STAT. § 828.23(7)(b) (1993).
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support its decision not to enact a similar exemption for the Santeria
method of slaughter. 8
In Hialeah, the Supreme Court elaborated on one of the exceptions
to the general test announced in Smith. If a statute targets a particular
religious practice for discriminatory treatment, the court should apply
the compelling interest test. 239 "At a minimum, the protections of the
Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against
some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because
it is undertaken for religious reasons." 2 m Because the statute, like the
ordinances at issue in Hialeah, provides an exception for a religious
method of slaughter, it discriminates between religious and non-relig-
ious methods of slaughter. Further, as with the ordinances in Hialeah,
because the statute provides an exception for one religious method
and not another, it discriminates among religions. Although the Hi-
aleah Court declined to address whether the differential treatment of
two religions constitutes an independent constitutional violation, it
did cite this feature as support for its conclusion that Santeria alone
served as the exclusive legislative concern of the city when it enacted
the ordinances.24' Thus, although the state statute existed well before
the Santeria followers began their practice in Hialeah, in response to a
free exercise challenge by the Church, the state would have to show a
compelling interest for not enacting an exception to the law for the
Santeria method of slaughter.
Finally, with the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993,242 the government cannot "substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability."24 The government can, however, "substantially bur-
den a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that applica-
tion of the burden to the person-() is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest . . . and (2) is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest. ' '244 Thus, the new law
specifically disapproves the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
Smith and attempts to reinstate the Sherbert compelling interest
test.245 Several ambiguities exist in the new law, however, including
238. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-89; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).
239. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79; Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
240. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. at 2226.
241. Id. at 2228.
242. See discussion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and its passage, supra note 63.
243. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488, § 3(a)
(1993).
244. Id. § 3(b).
245. Id. § 2.
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whether any neutral law that burdens religious exercise can survive
constitutional scrutiny24 and whether the new law reinstates the pure
Sherbert test or simply. re-establishes the law applicable to free exer-
cise claims before Smith.2 47
Therefore, after Smith, Hialeah, and the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, to withstand a free exercise challenge to the humane
slaughter requirement, the state would have to show a compelling in-
terest and have a religiously-neutral reason for not providing an ex-
ception for the Santeria method of slaughter. The state can assert a
general compelling interest in ensuring that animals are free from abu-
sive, inhumane treatment.4 8 And, because Congress has found, in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, that "laws 'neutral' toward relig-
ion may burden religious exercise, 2 49 the treatment of animal cruelty
laws in general and slaughter regulations in particular remains an
open question. Therefore, if the state can prove that the Santeria
method is more inhumane than the methods already provided for in
the statute, the statute may withstand a free exercise challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Free Exercise Clause forms an important part of the protec-
tions provided in the United States Constitution. Nevertheless, in cer-
tain circumstances, government and societal interests may outweigh
the religious protections afforded by the Constitution. Indeed, no
group, religious or otherwise, has "an absolute and unbridled right to
pursue any practice of its own choosing." 250
The prevention of cruelty to animals serves as an important, com-
pelling governmental interest. Animal cruelty laws are "enacted to
satisfy our . . . inclination that sentient beings have a right to be free
from physical abuse." ' 25' Further, "the qualities of a civilization are
246. See id. § 2(a)(2) ("laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely
as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise").
247. Questions exist as to whether cases that the Supreme Court decided after Sherbert and
before Smith, such as Bowen, Lyng, and Lee, and in which the Court declined to apply the
compelling interest test to grant an exception, remain good law. See supra note 55.
248. This argument would be strengthened if the state repealed the exemption for the Kosher
method of slaughter, but because of political forces, this is not likely to occur. For an analysis of
why religious exemptions to slaughter statutes should not be permitted, see Shaddow, supra note
16, at 1367.
249. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 141, 107 Stat. 1488 § 2(a)(2)
(1993) (emphasis added).
250. State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 107 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
954 (1976).
251. Shaddow, supra note 16, at 1395.
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evident in the treatment of the weak and powerless."2"2 Although the
Supreme Court and Congress have established some difficult barriers
to the prevention of animal sacrifice, local government can attempt to
clear those barriers through zoning, regulation, and licensing require-
ments. "Holding ideas more important than the right of a living, feel-
ing thing to be free from immense suffering is fundamentally
dangerous. Nothing in the [F]irst [A]mendment requires such a con-
clusion. ''23
252. id. at 1367 (quoting Humane Slaughtering of Livestock and Poultry: Hearings on S.
1636 Before a Subcom. of the Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 138
(1956) (statement of R. Harvey Dastrup, legislative assistant)).
253. Shaddow, supra note 16, at 1395 (citing Brief of the Humane Society of the United
States, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee, City of Hialeah, at 25, Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, No. 90-5176 (1 1th Cir. filed Feb. 22, 1990)) (footnote omitted).

